Nick Szaunig 79010a926b fix(backend): close two SSRF bypasses in webhook URL validation
1. The URL guard only classified IP-literal hostnames; any plain domain
   name (the common case) skipped validation entirely. Hostnames are now
   resolved via DNS and every returned address is checked against the
   same private/loopback/link-local ranges (net.BlockList), so an
   attacker-controlled domain pointed at an internal IP is rejected too.
2. fetch() follows redirects by default, so a registered public URL could
   302 to an internal target at delivery time. Delivery now uses
   redirect: 'manual' so such a redirect is never followed.
2026-08-23 11:08:40 +02:00
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