Benutzer koennen jetzt selbst Zwei-Faktor-Authentifizierung einrichten
und ihr Profil verwalten (Name, E-Mail, Passwort, Profilbild).
Backend:
- Neues MfaModule (src/auth/mfa/): AES-256-GCM-verschluesselte
TOTP-Secrets (otplib), QR-Code-Erzeugung, kurzlebige Setup-/
Challenge-JWTs fuer den 2-Schritt-Login-Flow
- Neues ProfileModule (src/profile/): PATCH /profile,
POST /profile/password, POST/DELETE/GET /profile/avatar,
POST /profile/mfa/enroll(/confirm), POST /profile/mfa/disable -
alle self-scoped ueber actor.id, ohne @RequirePermission (siehe
ALLOWLIST in authorization-coverage.e2e-spec.ts)
- AuthService.login() zweistufig: bei aktivem MFA erst
{ mfaRequired, mfaToken } statt Tokens, neuer Endpunkt
POST /auth/mfa/verify schliesst den Flow ab
- Admin-Recovery: POST /users/:id/mfa/reset (users:update) fuer
verlorene MFA-Geraete, da es keinen E-Mail-Reset-Flow gibt
Frontend:
- Login-Seite mit zweitem Schritt fuer den TOTP-Code
- Neue Profilseite (/profile, ausserhalb des admin-only
Settings-Bereichs): Profilbild, Name/E-Mail, Passwort, MFA-Ein-/
Ausrichtung mit QR-Code-Dialog
- Header zeigt jetzt Avatar mit Dropdown (Profil/Abmelden) statt
nur E-Mail-Text
- Admin-Users-Tabelle zeigt MFA-Status + Reset-Button
Haertung nach Security-Review (Backend/Frontend-Diff, kein CRITICAL,
mehrere MEDIUM behoben):
- Access-Token wird bei Passwortwechsel sofort ungueltig
(User.passwordChangedAt + JWT-iat-Vergleich in
PermissionResolverService.isTokenValid, vorher isUserActive) statt
erst nach bis zu 15 Minuten
- E-Mail-Aenderung verlangt jetzt aktuelles Passwort
- POST /profile/password und /profile/mfa/disable haben jetzt das
gleiche strikte Throttling wie Login (SENSITIVE_ACTION_THROTTLE)
- Kein stiller leerer Verschluesselungs-Key-Fallback mehr (wirft
jetzt explizit)
Bewusst zurueckgestellt (dokumentiert, kein aktiver Exploit-Pfad):
dedizierter Verschluesselungs-Key fuer MFA-Secrets statt
JWT_ACCESS_SECRET-Ableitung, dedizierte users:mfa-reset-Permission
statt users:update, separate JWT-Secrets pro Token-Zweck.
Verifiziert: tsc/eslint clean, 297/297 Backend- + 31/31
Frontend-Unit-Tests, Build clean auf beiden Projekten. e2e weiterhin
durch bekanntes WSL2/Postgres-Problem blockiert. Unabhaengiges
Security- und Code-Quality-Review durchgefuehrt (0 CRITICAL, 0 HIGH).
100 lines
3.4 KiB
TypeScript
100 lines
3.4 KiB
TypeScript
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
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import {
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DiscoveryModule,
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DiscoveryService,
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MetadataScanner,
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Reflector,
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} from '@nestjs/core';
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import { PATH_METADATA } from '@nestjs/common/constants';
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import { AppModule } from '../src/app.module';
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import { IS_PUBLIC_KEY } from '../src/auth/decorators/public.decorator';
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import { REQUIRE_PERMISSION_KEY } from '../src/auth/decorators/require-permission.decorator';
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import { PERMISSION_CATALOG } from '../src/auth/permissions/permission-catalog';
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// Routes intentionally left without a role/permission check: they act on the
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// caller's own data (notifications) or are the auth bootstrap endpoint that
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// every authenticated user must be able to reach regardless of permissions.
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const ALLOWLIST = new Set([
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'NotificationsController.findAll',
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'NotificationsController.markRead',
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'AuthController.me',
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'ProfileController.updateProfile',
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'ProfileController.changePassword',
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'ProfileController.uploadAvatar',
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'ProfileController.deleteAvatar',
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'ProfileController.getAvatar',
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'ProfileController.enrollMfa',
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'ProfileController.confirmMfaEnrollment',
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'ProfileController.disableMfa',
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]);
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describe('Authorization coverage (e2e)', () => {
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it('every non-public route requires a catalog-valid permission', async () => {
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const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
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imports: [AppModule, DiscoveryModule],
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}).compile();
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const discovery = moduleRef.get(DiscoveryService);
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const reflector = moduleRef.get(Reflector);
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const scanner = moduleRef.get(MetadataScanner);
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const catalogKeys = new Set<string>(
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PERMISSION_CATALOG.map((entry) => entry.key),
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);
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const uncoveredRoutes: string[] = [];
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const invalidPermissionKeys: string[] = [];
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for (const wrapper of discovery.getControllers()) {
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const instance = wrapper.instance as object | undefined;
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if (!instance) {
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continue;
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}
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const constructor = instance.constructor;
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const controllerName = constructor.name;
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const prototype = Object.getPrototypeOf(instance) as object;
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const isPublicClass =
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reflector.get<boolean>(IS_PUBLIC_KEY, constructor) === true;
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for (const methodName of scanner.getAllMethodNames(prototype)) {
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const handler = (prototype as Record<string, () => unknown>)[
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methodName
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];
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const isRouteHandler =
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Reflect.getMetadata(PATH_METADATA, handler) !== undefined;
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if (!isRouteHandler) {
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continue;
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}
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const routeKey = `${controllerName}.${methodName}`;
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const isPublicMethod =
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reflector.get<boolean>(IS_PUBLIC_KEY, handler) === true;
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if (isPublicClass || isPublicMethod || ALLOWLIST.has(routeKey)) {
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continue;
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}
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const permissions = reflector.getAllAndOverride<string[]>(
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REQUIRE_PERMISSION_KEY,
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[handler, constructor],
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);
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const hasPermissions =
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Array.isArray(permissions) && permissions.length > 0;
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if (!hasPermissions) {
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uncoveredRoutes.push(routeKey);
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}
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if (hasPermissions) {
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for (const key of permissions) {
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if (!catalogKeys.has(key)) {
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invalidPermissionKeys.push(`${routeKey} -> ${key}`);
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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expect(uncoveredRoutes).toEqual([]);
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expect(invalidPermissionKeys).toEqual([]);
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await moduleRef.close();
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});
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});
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