Platform backbone (plan 2026-10-13-plattform-rueckgrat), reviewed tasks: - run roles api/worker/job/all with shared startup checks (Task 1) - schema and migration for DomainEvent, deliveries, JobRun, ThrottlerHit (Task 2) - audit, notifications and domain events written in the same transaction (Task 3) - dispatcher with SKIP LOCKED claims, retries and stale release (Task 4) - worker building blocks: tick, LISTEN/NOTIFY wake-up, health (Task 5) - worker process and entry points (Task 6) - throttler counters in Postgres (Task 19) - separate keys per purpose with key ring (Task 20) - public origin page without exact location (Task 22) - shop keys split into read and write (Task 23) - Kustomize base, components, overlay encry, CI validation (Task 26) Field capture T3 (plan 2026-10-13-t3-erfassung-am-stand), reviewed tasks: - brood frames, read endpoints, apiary overview and offline pack - network basics, offline queue v3, navigation sheets, form building blocks - new inspection with last-time hints and weather, varroa per day, treatment prefill, apiary page with round - inspection photo (Task 10) is implemented, review pending Not rolled out. Remaining tasks follow in later commits. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
115 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript
115 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript
import { Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
|
|
import { KEY_ID_PATTERN } from '../../common/crypto/key-ring';
|
|
import {
|
|
decryptMfaSecret,
|
|
encryptMfaSecret,
|
|
mfaSecretNeedsRekey,
|
|
} from './mfa-crypto.util';
|
|
|
|
// Written by the code before the key ring (AES key sha256(JWT_ACCESS_SECRET),
|
|
// no key id) with JWT_ACCESS_SECRET = 'x' * 40.
|
|
const LEGACY_SECRET =
|
|
'zJD2lAy1b/wslLyQ.hn8scDeaxIADXlRFtcGIyg==.3+5qbYM52lKKN/VXpInUOQ==';
|
|
const PLAINTEXT = 'JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP';
|
|
|
|
describe('mfa-crypto.util', () => {
|
|
const originalEnv = { ...process.env };
|
|
|
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
|
process.env.JWT_ACCESS_SECRET = 'x'.repeat(40);
|
|
process.env.MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY = 'm'.repeat(40);
|
|
delete process.env.MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PREVIOUS;
|
|
jest.spyOn(Logger.prototype, 'warn').mockImplementation(() => undefined);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
afterEach(() => {
|
|
process.env = { ...originalEnv };
|
|
jest.restoreAllMocks();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('round-trips a TOTP secret and prefixes the key id', () => {
|
|
const ciphertext = encryptMfaSecret(PLAINTEXT);
|
|
|
|
expect(ciphertext).toMatch(KEY_ID_PATTERN);
|
|
expect(ciphertext).not.toContain(PLAINTEXT);
|
|
expect(decryptMfaSecret(ciphertext)).toBe(PLAINTEXT);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('produces a different ciphertext every time (random IV)', () => {
|
|
expect(encryptMfaSecret(PLAINTEXT)).not.toBe(encryptMfaSecret(PLAINTEXT));
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('no longer depends on JWT_ACCESS_SECRET', () => {
|
|
const ciphertext = encryptMfaSecret(PLAINTEXT);
|
|
process.env.JWT_ACCESS_SECRET = 'z'.repeat(40);
|
|
|
|
expect(decryptMfaSecret(ciphertext)).toBe(PLAINTEXT);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('fails to decrypt with the wrong key', () => {
|
|
const ciphertext = encryptMfaSecret(PLAINTEXT);
|
|
process.env.MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY = 'n'.repeat(40);
|
|
|
|
expect(() => decryptMfaSecret(ciphertext)).toThrow('unknown key id');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('opens a secret sealed with MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PREVIOUS and flags it for rekey', () => {
|
|
const ciphertext = encryptMfaSecret(PLAINTEXT);
|
|
process.env.MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PREVIOUS = process.env.MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY;
|
|
process.env.MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY = 'n'.repeat(40);
|
|
|
|
expect(decryptMfaSecret(ciphertext)).toBe(PLAINTEXT);
|
|
expect(mfaSecretNeedsRekey(ciphertext)).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('does not flag a secret sealed with the current key', () => {
|
|
expect(mfaSecretNeedsRekey(encryptMfaSecret(PLAINTEXT))).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('still opens a legacy MFA secret encrypted with the JWT-derived key', () => {
|
|
expect(decryptMfaSecret(LEGACY_SECRET)).toBe(PLAINTEXT);
|
|
expect(mfaSecretNeedsRekey(LEGACY_SECRET)).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('fails closed on a legacy secret once JWT_ACCESS_SECRET changed', () => {
|
|
process.env.JWT_ACCESS_SECRET = 'z'.repeat(40);
|
|
|
|
expect(() => decryptMfaSecret(LEGACY_SECRET)).toThrow(
|
|
'ciphertext failed authentication',
|
|
);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('never retries a k…: value that fails authentication with the legacy key', () => {
|
|
const warn = jest.spyOn(Logger.prototype, 'warn');
|
|
const currentKeyId = encryptMfaSecret(PLAINTEXT).split(':')[0];
|
|
// A valid legacy ciphertext behind the current key id: only a retry with
|
|
// sha256(JWT_ACCESS_SECRET) could open it.
|
|
const disguised = `${currentKeyId}:${LEGACY_SECRET}`;
|
|
|
|
expect(() => decryptMfaSecret(disguised)).toThrow(
|
|
'ciphertext failed authentication',
|
|
);
|
|
expect(() => decryptMfaSecret(`k00000000:${LEGACY_SECRET}`)).toThrow(
|
|
'unknown key id',
|
|
);
|
|
expect(warn).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('fails on a tampered ciphertext', () => {
|
|
const [keyId, body] = encryptMfaSecret(PLAINTEXT).split(':');
|
|
const [iv, tag, data] = body.split('.');
|
|
const bytes = Buffer.from(data, 'base64');
|
|
bytes[0] ^= 0xff;
|
|
|
|
expect(() =>
|
|
decryptMfaSecret(`${keyId}:${iv}.${tag}.${bytes.toString('base64')}`),
|
|
).toThrow('ciphertext failed authentication');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('rejects a malformed ciphertext', () => {
|
|
expect(() => decryptMfaSecret('not-a-valid-ciphertext')).toThrow(
|
|
'malformed ciphertext',
|
|
);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|