- Per-account lockout: five failed attempts (password, MFA code or a step-up confirmation) lock the account for 15 minutes, on top of the per-IP throttle - guesses spread over many addresses no longer help. - A TOTP code is accepted once: the time step is stored and that step or any earlier one is refused (also between two concurrent requests). - Login runs bcrypt on every path and answers unknown email, wrong password, deactivated and locked accounts with the same message; failed logins for unknown emails no longer write attacker-chosen text into the audit log. - Turning MFA off needs password and a current code; turning it on needs the password. Both end all other sessions. - New audit action ACCOUNT_LOCKED. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
294 lines
8.9 KiB
TypeScript
294 lines
8.9 KiB
TypeScript
import {
|
|
BadRequestException,
|
|
ConflictException,
|
|
Injectable,
|
|
NotFoundException,
|
|
UnauthorizedException,
|
|
} from '@nestjs/common';
|
|
import * as bcrypt from 'bcryptjs';
|
|
import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
|
|
import * as fs from 'node:fs/promises';
|
|
import * as path from 'node:path';
|
|
import { PrismaService } from '../prisma/prisma.service';
|
|
import { AuditLogService } from '../audit/audit-log.service';
|
|
import { matchesFileSignature } from '../common/file-signature';
|
|
import { MfaService, MfaEnrollment } from '../auth/mfa/mfa.service';
|
|
import { ReauthService } from '../auth/reauth/reauth.service';
|
|
import { PermissionResolverService } from '../auth/permissions/permission-resolver.service';
|
|
import { UsersService } from '../users/users.service';
|
|
import {
|
|
ALLOWED_AVATAR_MIME_TYPES,
|
|
MAX_AVATAR_SIZE_BYTES,
|
|
mimeTypeForExtension,
|
|
} from './avatar-mime-types';
|
|
import { UpdateProfileDto } from './dto/update-profile.dto';
|
|
|
|
const BCRYPT_SALT_ROUNDS = 12;
|
|
|
|
export interface ProfileSummary {
|
|
id: string;
|
|
email: string;
|
|
name: string;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function avatarStorageRoot(): string {
|
|
return path.join(
|
|
process.env.DOCUMENTS_STORAGE_PATH ?? './uploads',
|
|
'avatars',
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
@Injectable()
|
|
export class ProfileService {
|
|
constructor(
|
|
private readonly prisma: PrismaService,
|
|
private readonly auditLog: AuditLogService,
|
|
private readonly mfaService: MfaService,
|
|
private readonly permissionResolver: PermissionResolverService,
|
|
private readonly usersService: UsersService,
|
|
private readonly reauth: ReauthService,
|
|
) {}
|
|
|
|
/** MFA changed: every refresh token ends, the current access token runs out. */
|
|
private async revokeSessions(userId: string): Promise<void> {
|
|
await this.prisma.refreshToken.updateMany({
|
|
where: { userId, revokedAt: null },
|
|
data: { revokedAt: new Date() },
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private async requireUser(userId: string) {
|
|
const user = await this.prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { id: userId } });
|
|
if (!user) {
|
|
throw new NotFoundException('User not found');
|
|
}
|
|
return user;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async updateProfile(
|
|
userId: string,
|
|
dto: UpdateProfileDto,
|
|
): Promise<ProfileSummary> {
|
|
const before = await this.requireUser(userId);
|
|
if (dto.email && dto.email !== before.email) {
|
|
const currentMatches =
|
|
dto.currentPassword &&
|
|
(await bcrypt.compare(dto.currentPassword, before.passwordHash));
|
|
if (!currentMatches) {
|
|
throw new UnauthorizedException(
|
|
'Aktuelles Passwort erforderlich, um die E-Mail-Adresse zu ändern',
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const existing = await this.prisma.user.findFirst({
|
|
where: { email: { equals: dto.email, mode: 'insensitive' } },
|
|
});
|
|
if (existing) {
|
|
throw new ConflictException('Email already in use');
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const user = await this.prisma.user.update({
|
|
where: { id: userId },
|
|
data: { name: dto.name, email: dto.email },
|
|
});
|
|
await this.auditLog.record({
|
|
entityType: 'User',
|
|
entityId: userId,
|
|
action: 'UPDATE',
|
|
userId,
|
|
beforeData: { name: before.name, email: before.email },
|
|
afterData: { name: user.name, email: user.email },
|
|
});
|
|
return { id: user.id, email: user.email, name: user.name };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async changePassword(
|
|
userId: string,
|
|
currentPassword: string,
|
|
newPassword: string,
|
|
): Promise<void> {
|
|
const user = await this.requireUser(userId);
|
|
const currentMatches = await bcrypt.compare(
|
|
currentPassword,
|
|
user.passwordHash,
|
|
);
|
|
if (!currentMatches) {
|
|
throw new UnauthorizedException('Aktuelles Passwort ist falsch');
|
|
}
|
|
const passwordHash = await bcrypt.hash(newPassword, BCRYPT_SALT_ROUNDS);
|
|
await this.prisma.user.update({
|
|
where: { id: userId },
|
|
data: { passwordHash, passwordChangedAt: new Date() },
|
|
});
|
|
// A changed password should invalidate any session issued before the
|
|
// change, on this device or any other: refresh tokens are revoked
|
|
// outright, and the permission cache is cleared so JwtAuthGuard picks
|
|
// up the new passwordChangedAt within this request cycle instead of
|
|
// waiting out the cache TTL - that's what makes a still-live access
|
|
// token stop working immediately (see PermissionResolverService).
|
|
await this.prisma.refreshToken.updateMany({
|
|
where: { userId, revokedAt: null },
|
|
data: { revokedAt: new Date() },
|
|
});
|
|
this.permissionResolver.invalidateUser(userId);
|
|
await this.auditLog.record({
|
|
entityType: 'User',
|
|
entityId: userId,
|
|
action: 'UPDATE',
|
|
userId,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async deactivateAccount(
|
|
userId: string,
|
|
currentPassword: string,
|
|
): Promise<void> {
|
|
const user = await this.requireUser(userId);
|
|
const currentMatches = await bcrypt.compare(
|
|
currentPassword,
|
|
user.passwordHash,
|
|
);
|
|
if (!currentMatches) {
|
|
throw new UnauthorizedException('Aktuelles Passwort ist falsch');
|
|
}
|
|
await this.usersService.deactivate(userId, userId);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async uploadAvatar(userId: string, dataUrl: string): Promise<void> {
|
|
const match = /^data:(image\/(?:jpeg|png|webp));base64,(.+)$/.exec(dataUrl);
|
|
if (!match) {
|
|
throw new BadRequestException('Ungültiges Bildformat');
|
|
}
|
|
const [, mimeType, base64] = match;
|
|
if (!(mimeType in ALLOWED_AVATAR_MIME_TYPES)) {
|
|
throw new BadRequestException('Nicht unterstützter Dateityp');
|
|
}
|
|
const buffer = Buffer.from(base64, 'base64');
|
|
if (buffer.length > MAX_AVATAR_SIZE_BYTES) {
|
|
throw new BadRequestException('Datei zu groß (max. 2 MB)');
|
|
}
|
|
if (!matchesFileSignature(buffer, mimeType)) {
|
|
throw new BadRequestException(
|
|
'Datei entspricht nicht dem angegebenen Format',
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const user = await this.requireUser(userId);
|
|
const extension = ALLOWED_AVATAR_MIME_TYPES[mimeType];
|
|
const directory = avatarStorageRoot();
|
|
await fs.mkdir(directory, { recursive: true });
|
|
const avatarPath = path.join(
|
|
directory,
|
|
`${crypto.randomUUID()}${extension}`,
|
|
);
|
|
await fs.writeFile(avatarPath, buffer);
|
|
if (user.avatarPath) {
|
|
await fs.unlink(user.avatarPath).catch(() => undefined);
|
|
}
|
|
await this.prisma.user.update({
|
|
where: { id: userId },
|
|
data: { avatarPath },
|
|
});
|
|
await this.auditLog.record({
|
|
entityType: 'User',
|
|
entityId: userId,
|
|
action: 'UPDATE',
|
|
userId,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async deleteAvatar(userId: string): Promise<void> {
|
|
const user = await this.requireUser(userId);
|
|
if (!user.avatarPath) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
await fs.unlink(user.avatarPath).catch(() => undefined);
|
|
await this.prisma.user.update({
|
|
where: { id: userId },
|
|
data: { avatarPath: null },
|
|
});
|
|
await this.auditLog.record({
|
|
entityType: 'User',
|
|
entityId: userId,
|
|
action: 'UPDATE',
|
|
userId,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async getAvatar(
|
|
userId: string,
|
|
): Promise<{ buffer: Buffer; mimeType: string }> {
|
|
const user = await this.requireUser(userId);
|
|
if (!user.avatarPath) {
|
|
throw new NotFoundException('No avatar set');
|
|
}
|
|
const buffer = await fs.readFile(user.avatarPath);
|
|
return {
|
|
buffer,
|
|
mimeType: mimeTypeForExtension(path.extname(user.avatarPath)),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async enrollMfa(userId: string, email: string): Promise<MfaEnrollment> {
|
|
const user = await this.requireUser(userId);
|
|
if (user.mfaEnabled) {
|
|
throw new ConflictException('MFA is already enabled');
|
|
}
|
|
return this.mfaService.startEnrollment(userId, email);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async confirmMfaEnrollment(
|
|
userId: string,
|
|
email: string,
|
|
setupToken: string,
|
|
code: string,
|
|
currentPassword: string,
|
|
): Promise<void> {
|
|
// A stolen access token alone must not be able to put the attacker's
|
|
// own authenticator on the account.
|
|
await this.reauth.verify(userId, { password: currentPassword });
|
|
const { encryptedSecret } = await this.mfaService.confirmEnrollment(
|
|
userId,
|
|
setupToken,
|
|
email,
|
|
code,
|
|
);
|
|
await this.prisma.user.update({
|
|
where: { id: userId },
|
|
data: {
|
|
mfaEnabled: true,
|
|
mfaSecret: encryptedSecret,
|
|
mfaLastTimeStep: null,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
await this.revokeSessions(userId);
|
|
await this.auditLog.record({
|
|
entityType: 'User',
|
|
entityId: userId,
|
|
action: 'MFA_ENABLED',
|
|
userId,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Turning MFA off needs both factors: with the password alone, MFA would
|
|
* protect nothing against someone who already knows it.
|
|
*/
|
|
async disableMfa(
|
|
userId: string,
|
|
currentPassword: string,
|
|
mfaCode: string,
|
|
): Promise<void> {
|
|
await this.reauth.verify(userId, { password: currentPassword, mfaCode });
|
|
await this.prisma.user.update({
|
|
where: { id: userId },
|
|
data: { mfaEnabled: false, mfaSecret: null, mfaLastTimeStep: null },
|
|
});
|
|
await this.revokeSessions(userId);
|
|
await this.auditLog.record({
|
|
entityType: 'User',
|
|
entityId: userId,
|
|
action: 'MFA_DISABLED',
|
|
userId,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|