Die cloudflare-only-Annotation ist eine Traefik-Annotation und war mit
ingressClassName nginx wirkungslos. Produktion laeuft auf RKE2 mit Traefik
(Ingresses apicore-backend/-frontend), die Vorlagen nennen jetzt dieselbe
Klasse.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Die live gesetzte Annotation traefik.ingress.kubernetes.io/router.middlewares
fehlte in den Manifesten (Backend und Frontend). Sie schuetzt vor
Direktzugriff am Origin vorbei, nicht vor fremden Cloudflare-Zonen.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Documents, avatars and the encrypted app backups lived in ./uploads and
./backups inside the container and were lost on every restart. The
backend now mounts the apicore-data volume at /data (configmap paths
/data/documents and /data/backups).
Both deployments pin the image to a CI build (sha-<commit>) with
imagePullPolicy IfNotPresent instead of :latest, run as uid 1000 with
seccomp RuntimeDefault, no privilege escalation and all capabilities
dropped. The frontend gets a liveness probe.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Requests are set to an explicit 0 instead of being removed, because
Kubernetes defaults a missing request to the limit, which would reserve
even more. Limits stay as an upper bound.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
runs-on ubuntu-latest passte auf keinen registrierten Runner (Label
docker-builder erforderlich, siehe funktionierendes Referenzprojekt).
Push laeuft jetzt ueber den cluster-internen Service gitea:80 statt
git.encry.de, da der Cloudflare-Proxy Registry-Blob-Uploads mit "413
Payload Too Large" ablehnt. Auth ueber gitea.actor + REGISTRY_TOKEN
(GITEA_TOKEN hat kein Package-Write-Recht). Image-Pfad wird jetzt
kleingeschrieben (OCI verbietet Grossbuchstaben) - betrifft auch den
Owner-Namen in den K8s-Deployment-Manifesten.
Security review findings (HIGH-1/2/3, MEDIUM):
- Rate limiting via @nestjs/throttler: global 100 req/min default, stricter
10 req/min on login and refresh. Also closes the MEDIUM finding (public
batch-lookup enumeration) since it now sits behind the global limit too.
Trust the K8s ingress's single proxy hop so throttling keys off the real
client IP, not the ingress pod's IP.
- Auth events (login success/failure, logout, token refresh) are now
audit-logged via new AuditAction values, closing the gap where the
project's own audit-log principle never actually covered the Auth module.
- Refresh-token cookie now defaults to Secure=true (opt out only via
COOKIE_SECURE=false for local HTTP dev), instead of keying off NODE_ENV
which was never set in the K8s deploy templates. Added a TLS block +
cert-manager annotation to both the backend and frontend ingress
templates, which previously had no HTTPS termination configured at all.
