- Bottling quality: water content above the legal limit (strict >) answers
409 CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED bound to the measured value; prefill for jar
size, best-before (shelfLifeMonths, month-end clamping) and water content;
impossible dates give 400; water-content checks in src/common/quality.
- Frontend phenology: "Entwicklung melden" sheet, IndexedDB v4 queue,
season header on the apiary page, confirmed revoke for all apiaries.
- Frontend honey chain: "Vorschlag aus …" hints with explicit take-over,
prefill status note, movement ledger with withdraw/correct dialogs.
- Telegram: link tokens (hashed, single use), private-chat receiver with
lease and offset CAS, bounded poison-update skip, Retry-After, pending
deliveries skipped on disconnect; system API for deliveries and retry;
worker-only secret wiring and manifest policy tests.
- ARCHITECTURE.md §7, §9, §10, §11.11–11.13, Annahmen 51–55.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
- Weather history from Open-Meteo behind an adapter: worker loop
phenology-weather with backoff, Retry-After, User-Agent, chunked
writes and forecast-to-archive correction
- Phenology: growing degree sum per DWD, phase from reports, GTS and
calendar, calibration from previous years, daily job step,
SeasonService reads the stored state
- Honey chain: prefill for extractions and batches (proposals only),
plausibility and withdrawal warnings, Extraction lock, chain events
and batch.created webhook from HoneyBatchRecorded
- Telegram base: schema, NotificationDelivery outbox, hardened bot
client, startup check without crash, no-network-outside-loops guard
- ARCHITECTURE.md: sections 11.11-11.13, assumptions 42-46, env table
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Platform backbone (plan 2026-10-13-plattform-rueckgrat), reviewed tasks:
- run roles api/worker/job/all with shared startup checks (Task 1)
- schema and migration for DomainEvent, deliveries, JobRun, ThrottlerHit (Task 2)
- audit, notifications and domain events written in the same transaction (Task 3)
- dispatcher with SKIP LOCKED claims, retries and stale release (Task 4)
- worker building blocks: tick, LISTEN/NOTIFY wake-up, health (Task 5)
- worker process and entry points (Task 6)
- throttler counters in Postgres (Task 19)
- separate keys per purpose with key ring (Task 20)
- public origin page without exact location (Task 22)
- shop keys split into read and write (Task 23)
- Kustomize base, components, overlay encry, CI validation (Task 26)
Field capture T3 (plan 2026-10-13-t3-erfassung-am-stand), reviewed tasks:
- brood frames, read endpoints, apiary overview and offline pack
- network basics, offline queue v3, navigation sheets, form building blocks
- new inspection with last-time hints and weather, varroa per day,
treatment prefill, apiary page with round
- inspection photo (Task 10) is implemented, review pending
Not rolled out. Remaining tasks follow in later commits.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
LAN-Adressen als vertrauenswuerdige Hops waren unnoetig weit: Traefik
verwirft X-Forwarded-For von LAN-Clients ohnehin, sie sind selbst Absender.
Vertraut werden nur noch 10.42.0.0/16 (Traefik-Pods) und die Cloudflare-Netze.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Mit TRUST_PROXY=1 (Standard) war req.ip die Cloudflare-Edge, weil Traefik
sie als letzten X-Forwarded-For-Eintrag anhaengt. Rate-Limits trafen damit
alle Clients derselben Edge gemeinsam, und IP-Freigaben von API-Schluesseln
sahen nie die echte Adresse.
Vorlage und .env.example nennen jetzt "loopback, uniquelocal" plus die
Cloudflare-Netze: Express nimmt den ersten Eintrag von rechts ausserhalb
dieser Netze, also den Client, den Cloudflare angehaengt hat. Vom Client
mitgeschickte Eintraege links davon erreicht die Auswertung nie.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
- New passwords (create user, admin reset, own change) need at least 12
characters (ASVS 2.1.1) and may not exceed 72 bytes, which bcrypt would
silently cut off.
- They are checked against Have I Been Pwned with k-anonymity (only the
first 5 SHA-1 characters leave the server, padded responses); an
unreachable service is logged and does not block. PASSWORD_BREACH_CHECK
=false disables it for offline deployments.
- Login accepts existing passwords as before, capped at 256 characters to
bound anonymous bcrypt work.
- Password fields in the UI say the rule up front.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
- ThrottlerGuard runs first, so requests with wrong tokens or API keys
count against the rate limit before any database lookup.
- TRUST_PROXY (hop count or Express list) replaces the hard-coded 1.
- Every API answer except the public lot pages is Cache-Control: no-store
without ETag; helmet sends default-src 'none' / frame-ancestors 'none'
(Swagger keeps the page policy when enabled) and same-site CORP.
- Request log lines carry the path only - no query strings (the SSO
callback's code and state no longer reach the logs).
- In production the server refuses to start without an https
FRONTEND_ORIGIN or with COOKIE_SECURE=false.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
- Rotation claims the old token with a conditional update; of two
concurrent refreshes only one gets a successor, so a stolen token cannot
fork into two live sessions.
- A token rotated out less than 10 s ago (parallel tab) is refused without
revoking every session; later reuse still revokes them all.
- Sessions end at most SESSION_MAX_AGE (default 7 days) after login: the
login time is inherited by every rotated token and caps its expiry.
- The refresh cookie is cleared with the same attributes it was set with.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
backup:configure could point automatic backups at any writable directory
(e.g. a statically served one) and set a cron of every second; an invalid
expression deleted the running job before failing, silently ending
backups.
- A path entered in the UI is resolved under BACKUP_ROOT (default
./backups) and refused if it leaves it; env values stay unrestricted.
- The schedule must be a five-field cron that runs at most hourly.
- reload() validates before replacing the running job.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Backups carried every password hash, encrypted MFA secret and webhook
secret in plain JSON, and an import upserted arbitrary rows - including
users - so anyone holding backup:import, or tricking an admin into
importing a file, could overwrite the admin account with a known password.
- Export (download and scheduled) is AES-256-GCM over the gzipped bundle,
key from BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY or derived from JWT_ACCESS_SECRET via
HKDF; header is authenticated, decompression is capped. Scheduled files
are written 0600 in a 0700 directory; run-now returns only the file name.
- Import requires the current password (and TOTP when MFA is on).
- Only a sealed file restores users, roles, grants, webhooks and audit
entries; an old unsealed file restores business data only and reports
what it skipped.
- Audit entries are append-only on import.
- Imported documents: entityType checked against the enum, MIME type
allowlisted and matched against the file signature, path kept under the
storage root (no more directory traversal via entityType).
- Permission cache is cleared after an import.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
One Entra enterprise application now covers both interactive login and
the calendar sync's client-credentials Graph access, instead of
requiring a second app registration. GraphClientService reads
OIDC_ISSUER_URL/OIDC_CLIENT_ID/OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET (same as SSO) and
derives the tenant ID from the issuer URL's path, rather than three
dedicated M365_CALENDAR_* env vars. The app registration just needs the
"Calendars.ReadWrite" Application permission added alongside its
existing delegated login scopes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Adds a one-way push (ApiCore -> M365) of Aufgaben/Durchsichten/
Behandlungen/Fütterungen/Ernten/Königinnen-Zuordnungen into the calendar
of a Microsoft 365 group, via the Graph API.
- CalendarSyncModule (app-only client-credentials Graph auth, separate
from the interactive SSO app registration; new env vars
M365_CALENDAR_TENANT_ID/_CLIENT_ID/_CLIENT_SECRET).
- Outbox + minute-interval cron worker (CalendarSyncOutboxEntry) instead
of a synchronous push, since Graph calls are too slow/flaky to block a
domain create request on; failed syncs retry up to 5 times.
- Per-source-type toggle plus a group-ID field, configurable in
Verwaltung > Automatisierung > Kalender-Sync (Verwaltung > Backup, an
env var still wins on those fields where one applies to related config).
- Hooked into Tasks/Inspections/Treatments/Feedings/Harvests/Queens at
their existing create (and Task update/complete) points; entries render
as all-day Graph events to avoid timezone ambiguity.
- Documents the design decision in ARCHITECTURE.md (Annahme 9), since
this is a net-new capability the lastenheft doesn't scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
- SiteSettings gains websiteUrl (e.g. online shop link) alongside the
existing social links, editable in Verwaltung > Automatisierung.
- /herkunft/[lot] now shows the apiary's Standort instead of its internal
Name (so multiple apiaries at one location read as one origin), adds
small icons per social link, and surfaces previously-fetched-but-unused
data (Honigsorte, Abfülldatum, stat cards) to make the page a richer
customer-facing info page.
- Backup schedule (path/cron/retention) is now also configurable via the
GUI (Verwaltung > Backup), stored in a new BackupSettings singleton;
an env var always wins over the GUI value per field, and the scheduler
reloads its cron job live when GUI settings change.
- New Automatisierung rules let an admin define a format (e.g.
"WH-{YYYY}-{SEQ:4}") that auto-generates HoneyBatch.batchNumber and
BottlingBatch.lotNumber on creation, with an atomic per-rule sequence
counter and a manual reset. Manual entry still works when the rule is
inactive.
Backup export/import now covers Role, User, RolePermission,
Notification, AuditLog and Document (with actual file content), not
just business data - matching "wirklich alle Daten". Role/User use
natural keys (role.key, resource+action) so a bundle restores cleanly
into a different database.
Adds BackupSchedulerService (@nestjs/schedule) for cron-based automatic
backups to a local path (BACKUP_STORAGE_PATH), with retention pruning
and a file-mtime guard against duplicate runs across replicas. New
GET /backup/schedule and POST /backup/schedule/run-now endpoints, plus
a status card and manual trigger in the frontend Backup settings page.
JWT_ACCESS_SECRET war zwar als Pflicht-Env-Var geprueft, aber ohne
Mindestlaenge - ein kurzer/erratbarer Wert haette nicht nur das
Faelschen von Access-/MFA-/SSO-Tokens fuer jeden Nutzer erlaubt,
sondern auch (ueber mfa-crypto.util.ts, das den AES-Schluessel fuer
gespeicherte TOTP-Secrets aus genau diesem Wert ableitet) das
Entschluesseln aller gespeicherten MFA-Secrets.
main.ts bricht den Start jetzt mit klarer Fehlermeldung ab, wenn
JWT_ACCESS_SECRET kuerzer als 32 Zeichen ist. .env.example und das
K8s-Secret-Template zeigen jetzt einen ausreichend langen Platzhalter
mit Erzeugungshinweis (openssl rand -hex 32).
Betrifft nur main.ts's bootstrap() - e2e-Tests bootstrappen ueber
test/utils/create-test-app.ts direkt via configureApp() und durchlaufen
diese Pruefung nicht, daher keine Testanpassung noetig.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Weitere vom Sicherheitsaudit gemeldete Luecken behoben, die bisher als
niedrige Prioritaet offen gelassen wurden:
- SSO-Login (Entra ID) prüft jetzt lokale MFA genauso wie der
Passwort-Login: ist mfaEnabled gesetzt, liefert /auth/sso/complete
denselben mfaRequired-Codepfad wie /auth/login, bevor Tokens
ausgestellt werden. Frontend (Login-Seite, AuthContext) zeigt in dem
Fall den bestehenden Code-Eingabe-Schritt statt die Anmeldung
stillschweigend abzuschliessen.
- Avatar- und Dokument-Uploads pruefen jetzt die tatsaechlichen
Datei-Bytes (Magic Numbers fuer PNG/JPEG/WEBP/PDF) statt nur dem
client-angegebenen MIME-Typ/data:-URL-Praefix zu vertrauen.
- Swagger-UI (/api/v1/docs) ist jetzt standardmaessig deaktiviert
(ENABLE_SWAGGER=true erforderlich), da sie zuvor das komplette
API-Schema ungeschuetzt oeffentlich preisgab.
npm-audit-Warnungen (deepmerge-ts/mysql2 unter prisma) bewusst nicht
gefixt: kein stabiles Prisma-Release loest sie bislang auf, nur eine
Release-Candidate-Hauptversion - das Risiko eines Downgrades/RC-Upgrades
der Datenbankschicht uebersteigt den Nutzen fuer eine Kette, die zur
Laufzeit ohnehin nicht erreichbar ist (nur Prisma-CLI, nur MySQL-Treiber,
dieses Projekt nutzt Postgres).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Security review findings (HIGH-1/2/3, MEDIUM):
- Rate limiting via @nestjs/throttler: global 100 req/min default, stricter
10 req/min on login and refresh. Also closes the MEDIUM finding (public
batch-lookup enumeration) since it now sits behind the global limit too.
Trust the K8s ingress's single proxy hop so throttling keys off the real
client IP, not the ingress pod's IP.
- Auth events (login success/failure, logout, token refresh) are now
audit-logged via new AuditAction values, closing the gap where the
project's own audit-log principle never actually covered the Auth module.
- Refresh-token cookie now defaults to Secure=true (opt out only via
COOKIE_SECURE=false for local HTTP dev), instead of keying off NODE_ENV
which was never set in the K8s deploy templates. Added a TLS block +
cert-manager annotation to both the backend and frontend ingress
templates, which previously had no HTTPS termination configured at all.
/login: Formular gegen AuthProvider (Access-Token im Memory, Refresh
per httpOnly-Cookie), Fehlermeldung bei falschen Zugangsdaten.
(app)/layout.tsx: geschuetztes Layout, leitet ohne Session zu /login um,
Header mit Nutzer-E-Mail + Abmelden. settings/layout.tsx: zusaetzliches
Admin-Gate fuer /settings/users.
/settings/users: Liste, Anlegen-Dialog (shadcn/Base UI Dialog+Select),
Deaktivieren - alles ueber TanStack Query gegen die Users-API.
proxy.ts (Next 16 Nachfolger von middleware.ts): optimistische
Cookie-Praesenz-Pruefung fuer /login und /settings/*, echte
Autorisierung bleibt serverseitig (RolesGuard).
Backend-Fixes waehrend Browser-Verifikation gefunden und behoben:
- CORS fehlte komplett (app.enableCors, FRONTEND_ORIGIN) - jeder
Cross-Origin-Request von :3000 nach :3001 wurde geblockt.
- React-StrictMode-Doppel-Effect liess zwei parallele Refresh-Aufrufe
laufen; da Refresh-Tokens rotierend/einmalig sind, gewann einer und
der andere bekam 401 -> Nutzer flog nach jedem Reload aus der Session.
Fix: AbortController im Session-Restore-Effect.
- Manifest verwies auf nicht existente PNG-Icons (404); durch
public/icon.svg ersetzt.
7 Vitest-Tests (Login-Formular, Users-Liste, JWT-Decode), Lint,
Typecheck und Build gruen. Kompletter Flow (Login, Reload-Persistenz,
Benutzer anlegen/deaktivieren, Abmelden, Redirect ohne Session) live
im Browser gegen den echten Server verifiziert.
