- Every JWT carries a jti. The SSO completion token and the MFA challenge
(once a code was accepted) are recorded as used in ConsumedToken; a
replayed request or copied cookie cannot open a second session. Used
ids are cleaned up after they expire.
- The token-validity check (active user, active role, password change)
reads fresh on every request and refreshes the permission cache, so a
deactivation or role change made on another replica applies to the very
next request instead of up to 30 s later.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
- Public lot lookup: 30 requests/min per IP and only well-formed lot
numbers (1-64 chars) reach the database.
- SSO callback URL is built from OIDC_REDIRECT_URI instead of the Host
header; SSO cookies are cleared with the attributes they were set with.
- Logout is rate-limited like the other auth endpoints.
- Middleware errors with a 4xx status (body too large, malformed JSON)
answer with that status instead of a 500; error log lines carry the
path without query string.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
SSO picked the local account by the email/preferred_username claim, which
Entra does not verify. Anyone able to present a matching email (another
tenant with a multi-tenant issuer, or an editable attribute) could sign in
as that user without a password.
- The first SSO login links the account to "<iss>|<oid>" (new unique
column User.ssoSubject); afterwards only that identity signs in, and a
matching email from another identity is refused.
- Multi-tenant issuers (common/organizations/consumers) disable SSO.
- Emails are compared case-insensitively and stored lower-case, so
[email protected] and [email protected] can no longer be two accounts; the migration
lower-cases existing emails where that does not collide.
- An admin changing a user's email clears the link.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
All JWTs (access, MFA setup, MFA challenge, SSO completion) were signed
with the same secret and the access-token strategy checked only signature
and expiry. The MFA challenge token returned after the password step
therefore worked as a full access token: a password alone was enough to
use the API, skipping the second factor.
Every token now carries a pinned issuer, algorithm (HS256) and a
per-purpose audience; the strategy accepts only the access audience and
rejects any payload carrying a helper-token purpose. Existing access
tokens (no audience) stop working; clients renew them via the refresh
cookie.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Weitere vom Sicherheitsaudit gemeldete Luecken behoben, die bisher als
niedrige Prioritaet offen gelassen wurden:
- SSO-Login (Entra ID) prüft jetzt lokale MFA genauso wie der
Passwort-Login: ist mfaEnabled gesetzt, liefert /auth/sso/complete
denselben mfaRequired-Codepfad wie /auth/login, bevor Tokens
ausgestellt werden. Frontend (Login-Seite, AuthContext) zeigt in dem
Fall den bestehenden Code-Eingabe-Schritt statt die Anmeldung
stillschweigend abzuschliessen.
- Avatar- und Dokument-Uploads pruefen jetzt die tatsaechlichen
Datei-Bytes (Magic Numbers fuer PNG/JPEG/WEBP/PDF) statt nur dem
client-angegebenen MIME-Typ/data:-URL-Praefix zu vertrauen.
- Swagger-UI (/api/v1/docs) ist jetzt standardmaessig deaktiviert
(ENABLE_SWAGGER=true erforderlich), da sie zuvor das komplette
API-Schema ungeschuetzt oeffentlich preisgab.
npm-audit-Warnungen (deepmerge-ts/mysql2 unter prisma) bewusst nicht
gefixt: kein stabiles Prisma-Release loest sie bislang auf, nur eine
Release-Candidate-Hauptversion - das Risiko eines Downgrades/RC-Upgrades
der Datenbankschicht uebersteigt den Nutzen fuer eine Kette, die zur
Laufzeit ohnehin nicht erreichbar ist (nur Prisma-CLI, nur MySQL-Treiber,
dieses Projekt nutzt Postgres).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
