fix(backup): seal backups and require step-up auth to restore
Backups carried every password hash, encrypted MFA secret and webhook secret in plain JSON, and an import upserted arbitrary rows - including users - so anyone holding backup:import, or tricking an admin into importing a file, could overwrite the admin account with a known password. - Export (download and scheduled) is AES-256-GCM over the gzipped bundle, key from BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY or derived from JWT_ACCESS_SECRET via HKDF; header is authenticated, decompression is capped. Scheduled files are written 0600 in a 0700 directory; run-now returns only the file name. - Import requires the current password (and TOTP when MFA is on). - Only a sealed file restores users, roles, grants, webhooks and audit entries; an old unsealed file restores business data only and reports what it skipped. - Audit entries are append-only on import. - Imported documents: entityType checked against the enum, MIME type allowlisted and matched against the file signature, path kept under the storage root (no more directory traversal via entityType). - Permission cache is cleared after an import. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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import { Injectable, UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
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import * as bcrypt from 'bcryptjs';
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import { PrismaService } from '../../prisma/prisma.service';
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import { MfaService } from '../mfa/mfa.service';
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export interface ReauthProof {
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password?: string;
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mfaCode?: string;
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}
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/**
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* Step-up check for actions that are as powerful as the account itself
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* (restoring a backup overwrites every user): a stolen access token alone
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* must not be enough, so the caller proves they know the password - and,
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* with MFA on, holds the second factor - right now.
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*/
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@Injectable()
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export class ReauthService {
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constructor(
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private readonly prisma: PrismaService,
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private readonly mfaService: MfaService,
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) {}
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async verify(userId: string, proof: ReauthProof): Promise<void> {
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const user = await this.prisma.user.findUnique({
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where: { id: userId },
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select: {
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email: true,
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passwordHash: true,
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mfaEnabled: true,
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mfaSecret: true,
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isActive: true,
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},
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});
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const passwordMatches =
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Boolean(user?.isActive) &&
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typeof proof.password === 'string' &&
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(await bcrypt.compare(proof.password, user!.passwordHash));
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if (!user || !passwordMatches) {
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throw new UnauthorizedException(
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'Bitte zur Bestätigung Ihr aktuelles Passwort eingeben',
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);
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}
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if (user.mfaEnabled) {
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const codeMatches =
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typeof proof.mfaCode === 'string' &&
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user.mfaSecret !== null &&
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(await this.mfaService.verifyCode(
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user.mfaSecret,
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user.email,
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proof.mfaCode,
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));
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if (!codeMatches) {
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throw new UnauthorizedException(
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'Bitte zur Bestätigung den aktuellen Code aus Ihrer Authenticator-App eingeben',
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);
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}
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}
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}
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}
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