feat: MFA (TOTP) und Self-Service-Profilseite
Benutzer koennen jetzt selbst Zwei-Faktor-Authentifizierung einrichten
und ihr Profil verwalten (Name, E-Mail, Passwort, Profilbild).
Backend:
- Neues MfaModule (src/auth/mfa/): AES-256-GCM-verschluesselte
TOTP-Secrets (otplib), QR-Code-Erzeugung, kurzlebige Setup-/
Challenge-JWTs fuer den 2-Schritt-Login-Flow
- Neues ProfileModule (src/profile/): PATCH /profile,
POST /profile/password, POST/DELETE/GET /profile/avatar,
POST /profile/mfa/enroll(/confirm), POST /profile/mfa/disable -
alle self-scoped ueber actor.id, ohne @RequirePermission (siehe
ALLOWLIST in authorization-coverage.e2e-spec.ts)
- AuthService.login() zweistufig: bei aktivem MFA erst
{ mfaRequired, mfaToken } statt Tokens, neuer Endpunkt
POST /auth/mfa/verify schliesst den Flow ab
- Admin-Recovery: POST /users/:id/mfa/reset (users:update) fuer
verlorene MFA-Geraete, da es keinen E-Mail-Reset-Flow gibt
Frontend:
- Login-Seite mit zweitem Schritt fuer den TOTP-Code
- Neue Profilseite (/profile, ausserhalb des admin-only
Settings-Bereichs): Profilbild, Name/E-Mail, Passwort, MFA-Ein-/
Ausrichtung mit QR-Code-Dialog
- Header zeigt jetzt Avatar mit Dropdown (Profil/Abmelden) statt
nur E-Mail-Text
- Admin-Users-Tabelle zeigt MFA-Status + Reset-Button
Haertung nach Security-Review (Backend/Frontend-Diff, kein CRITICAL,
mehrere MEDIUM behoben):
- Access-Token wird bei Passwortwechsel sofort ungueltig
(User.passwordChangedAt + JWT-iat-Vergleich in
PermissionResolverService.isTokenValid, vorher isUserActive) statt
erst nach bis zu 15 Minuten
- E-Mail-Aenderung verlangt jetzt aktuelles Passwort
- POST /profile/password und /profile/mfa/disable haben jetzt das
gleiche strikte Throttling wie Login (SENSITIVE_ACTION_THROTTLE)
- Kein stiller leerer Verschluesselungs-Key-Fallback mehr (wirft
jetzt explizit)
Bewusst zurueckgestellt (dokumentiert, kein aktiver Exploit-Pfad):
dedizierter Verschluesselungs-Key fuer MFA-Secrets statt
JWT_ACCESS_SECRET-Ableitung, dedizierte users:mfa-reset-Permission
statt users:update, separate JWT-Secrets pro Token-Zweck.
Verifiziert: tsc/eslint clean, 297/297 Backend- + 31/31
Frontend-Unit-Tests, Build clean auf beiden Projekten. e2e weiterhin
durch bekanntes WSL2/Postgres-Problem blockiert. Unabhaengiges
Security- und Code-Quality-Review durchgefuehrt (0 CRITICAL, 0 HIGH).
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@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { PermissionKey } from './permission-catalog';
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interface CacheEntry {
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isActive: boolean;
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passwordChangedAt: Date | null;
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permissions: ReadonlySet<string>;
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expiresAt: number;
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}
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@@ -16,13 +17,14 @@ const CACHE_TTL_MS = 30_000;
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* role's grants takes effect without forcing a re-login), with a short TTL
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* cache to keep that from becoming a query-per-request cost. Call
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* invalidateUser/invalidateAll after any write to Role, Permission,
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* RolePermission, or User.roleId so the change is visible immediately
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* instead of waiting out the cache window.
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* RolePermission, User.roleId, or User.passwordChangedAt so the change is
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* visible immediately instead of waiting out the cache window.
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*
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* isUserActive shares the same cached entry: JwtAuthGuard calls it on every
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* isTokenValid shares the same cached entry: JwtAuthGuard calls it on every
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* authenticated request (including routes with no @RequirePermission) so a
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* deactivated user's still-valid access token stops working within the
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* cache TTL instead of staying usable until the token expires.
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* cache TTL instead of staying usable until the token expires, and so does
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* a token issued before the user's last password change.
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*/
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@Injectable()
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export class PermissionResolverService {
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@@ -35,9 +37,18 @@ export class PermissionResolverService {
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return entry.permissions;
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}
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async isUserActive(userId: string): Promise<boolean> {
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async isTokenValid(
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userId: string,
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tokenIssuedAtSeconds: number,
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): Promise<boolean> {
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const entry = await this.getEntry(userId);
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return entry.isActive;
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if (!entry.isActive) {
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return false;
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}
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if (!entry.passwordChangedAt) {
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return true;
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}
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return tokenIssuedAtSeconds * 1000 >= entry.passwordChangedAt.getTime();
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}
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async hasAny(
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@@ -74,6 +85,7 @@ export class PermissionResolverService {
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where: { id: userId },
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select: {
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isActive: true,
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passwordChangedAt: true,
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role: {
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select: {
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status: true,
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@@ -92,6 +104,7 @@ export class PermissionResolverService {
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: new Set<string>();
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return {
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isActive: isEligible,
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passwordChangedAt: user?.passwordChangedAt ?? null,
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permissions,
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expiresAt: Date.now() + CACHE_TTL_MS,
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};
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