fix(auth): lock accounts after failed attempts, one-time TOTP codes, stronger MFA changes
- Per-account lockout: five failed attempts (password, MFA code or a step-up confirmation) lock the account for 15 minutes, on top of the per-IP throttle - guesses spread over many addresses no longer help. - A TOTP code is accepted once: the time step is stored and that step or any earlier one is refused (also between two concurrent requests). - Login runs bcrypt on every path and answers unknown email, wrong password, deactivated and locked accounts with the same message; failed logins for unknown emails no longer write attacker-chosen text into the audit log. - Turning MFA off needs password and a current code; turning it on needs the password. Both end all other sessions. - New audit action ACCOUNT_LOCKED. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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@@ -20,6 +20,23 @@ export function buildTotpUri(secret: string, label: string): string {
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return createTotp(secret, label).toURI();
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}
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/**
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* The time step a code belongs to, or null if it is wrong - or not newer
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* than afterTimeStep (a code that was already used, or an older one).
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*/
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export async function verifyTotpStep(
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secret: string,
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label: string,
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code: string,
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afterTimeStep?: number,
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): Promise<number | null> {
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const result = await createTotp(secret, label).verify(code, {
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epochTolerance: EPOCH_TOLERANCE_SECONDS,
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afterTimeStep,
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});
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return result.valid ? result.timeStep : null;
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}
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export async function verifyTotpCode(
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secret: string,
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label: string,
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